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SOCIAL

ACTION

Christian Ideals and War Guilt


A Symposium

by

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SOCIAL ACTION

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IN MEMORIAM

Theodore Carswell Hume

In Chicago, where I first knew him, Ted Hume was the embodiment of social action. He and his wife, who might have lived in one of the pleasanter suburbs, made it a point of honor to stay in the neighborhood of their church, in a shadowed and deteriorated part of the city, washed by fierce tides of humanity. Those who would pit race against race had short shrift from Ted Hume's pulpit; but he did more than condemn—he gave himself to the positive task of establishing and supporting interracial agencies which healed and blessed.

His first social interest, however, was the international scene. As a student at the Sorbonne on a French Government stipend, he had translated Renouvin's *The Immediate Origins of the War*, bringing to English readers one of the first courageously objective accounts by an Allied historian of the events preceding 1914. He had spent three summers in Geneva as a newspaper correspondent reporting the meetings of the League of Nations. One of the best-informed citizens of Chicago on international affairs, he gave hours of every week to organizations devoted to the undergirding of peace.

When the news came to him that the General Council, in cooperation with the Committee for War Victims and Services, the Council for Social Action, and the American Board, was seeking a man for the work of reconstruction and relief in Europe under the auspices of the World Council of Churches, Ted Hume recognized his destiny. Long having desired to be a builder of bridges across the chasms of international distrust, he responded to the call, although he knew the way was dangerous, and set out on an errand of social action indeed.

Let who will say that he was cut off before his work was done. The seeming disaster has brought to American Christendom a moment of intense perception. Had he lived the three score years and ten, he could not have burned upon the mind of Christians as he has the meaning of the world-embracing, nation-reconciling Ecumenical Church. The cause he served, lighted by the heroic passion of his conviction, has now touched the imagination of uncounted others. When the war is over, the needy churches of the Continent will be moved to trust us more by the one death of Ted Hume than by all the words that all of us may speak. His entrance into immortality has meant for the rest of us an entrance into a new hope for the world.

DOUGLAS HORTON



Theodore C. Hume and Chaplain Maurice Reynolds photographed in front of Westminster Abbey early in October, 1943.

TO T.C.H.

July 10, 1904 — October 22, 1943

"I bare you on eagles' wings and brought you unto myself."

When the young eagle falls to earth
Shot from the skies by sky-borne enemy,
Robbed of his wings by wingéd dearth,
Reduced to clay by fiendish alchemy,
 We shall not stoop to search the strewén ground
 Where bits of broken pinion may be found,
 Nor wander downcast over hillside bare
 Looking for crumpled remnants resting there.

No, we shall scan the star-strewn space
Gazing toward heaven through the darkening night,
Trusting the eye of truth to trace
The shining spirit in its eager flight.

Farewell, young eagle! May you journey far
Beyond the range, the wrath-filled range of war.
Farewell—Godspeed—you bear our hopes and fears.
Send back to us your courage for our years.

D.J.B.

Rev. Theodore Carswell Hume was shot down by an enemy plane over Sweden on October 22, 1943, while on a mission for the World Council of Churches.

Theodore Carswell Hume

HIS THOUGHT AND WORK

Excerpts from a Tribute by Bernard E. Meland at a Memorial Service in the Claremont Church, 31 October, 1943.

I think all of us recognized the exceptional quality of Mr. Hume's mind. I remember the first time I heard him preach from this pulpit. He was dealing with the theme, Man's Search After God. It was exceedingly sensitive, yet affirming. It had the delicacy and haunting quality of a strong poem. Mr. Hume was at his best in the pulpit, when he was dealing with profound themes; for it was then that the discriminating and searching quality of his mind was most in evidence as a reverent quality. He handled these high themes with a humility that bespoke the sensitiveness of his mind and nature. This, I think, was one of his rarest gifts as preacher and thinker.

But more often Mr. Hume spoke in another key. He was by nature an activist in his thought. The world of action was the scene over which his mind played. Here the inter-play of passion and prejudice was more marked, for he dealt with contemporary matters that were urgent. And where ethical issues were at stake, his mind was unyielding.

I can hardly interpret Mr. Hume's thought adequately without some mention of the theology from which his thinking stemmed. Mr. Hume belonged to the younger generation of American theologians who have been influenced by Reinhold Niebuhr. During the early years of his ministry, Mr. Hume shared the enthusiasm which other younger ministers revealed for this vigorous new current of thought. But Mr. Hume's mind, like his personality, was complex. It had many facets. And while this neo-orthodox view strongly motivated his thinking and his preaching, it was not his sole source of insight. There was something of the Catholic in his thought and temper—not Roman, but Anglo-Catholic. He had great appreciation for the

tradition of the Church in its large aspect. And he made every effort to hold this sense of a total Christian tradition vividly before us.

Despite his leanings toward a renewed orthodoxy, Mr. Hume was an ardent Congregationalist in the social expression of his thought. No one, in my acquaintance, felt the call of the social conscience more keenly than he. It was world-wide in its sweep. You could not be in his presence a few minutes without feeling the gates of the community being swung open. He seemed to stand at those gates, peering for travelers from the far country that they might be brought to the community's table, to open our minds to the wider world. He literally reached out and brought them in.

Such a one cannot be all things to all people. He is inevitably selective—selective in friends as well as in ideas, in appreciations, in values. Certainly that was true of John Calvin. It was true of Beethoven. It has been true of many people of their temperament. I mention the names of Calvin and Beethoven together because I feel that Mr. Hume combined in his thinking, both *theologian* and *artist*. Now it is strenuous enough to be intensively a theologian. It is likewise demanding to be intensively an artist. Such a one, however, is a richer person. For he embodies in himself, qualities which enhance one another, as the Greek ideal enhanced the Hebraic in civilization. In Mr. Hume, the hunger for righteousness fused with a hunger for beauty in a way that was distinctly his spirit. I say it added to his charm and to his brilliance; it added also to the intensity of his nature. The sense of right and the sense of beauty: he sought to be loyal to both of them.



CHRISTIAN IDEALS AND WAR GUILT

BY WALTER HORTON

A feature of every peace settlement (including the approaching one) is the attempt to assess guilt and impose penalties for the horrors and disasters of the war that has ended. If statesmen do not busy themselves with these problems, popular outcry insists that they do so—usually demanding the death penalty for some individual or group regarded as primarily responsible for the whole tragedy. "We'll hang Jeff Davis to a sour apple tree," sang the North at the close of the Civil War. "Hang the Kaiser!" shouted the British public at the close of the First World War; and Lloyd George won an election on that slogan. Allied statesmen, egged on by similar popular demands, are now promising to punish the criminal leaders of the Axis powers, and warning neutrals against giving them refuge when they become fugitives from justice.

While statesmen generally think it necessary and right to yield to this popular clamor after "punishment of the guilty," they must always be concerned lest the blind and vengeful passions which express themselves in such outcries should sway the scales of justice, so leading to new wrongs, new hatreds, new wars. *Christian* statesmen above all, recognizing the perils of self-righteousness and acknowledging the ideal of love and forgiveness toward enemies, are bound to be self-critical when asked to serve as prosecutors, judges and executioners of their defeated political adversaries, and are bound to strain every nerve to keep the scales of justice even.

Strain as they may, they do not easily succeed. No Christian statesmen ever tried harder than Woodrow Wilson to be "just not only toward those to whom we wish to be just, but especially toward those to whom we do not wish to be just"—to quote

from a speech he delivered shortly before sailing for France. On arriving in Paris, he refused to visit the battlefields, lest his sense of indignation should corrupt his sense of justice. Yet he was ultimately led to set his hand to a peace treaty which, when partisan denunciations of it have been duly discounted, will have to be described as something less than the just and Christian settlement the world was expecting from his inspired leadership.

At what point did Woodrow Wilson's Christian judgment fail him most disastrously, in those terrible days at Versailles when his hair was gradually turning white and the hopes of mankind were gradually being darkened? It is possible to answer that question with some precision. Wilson slipped most disastrously when he allowed himself to sign the "War Guilt" clause, upon which the exorbitant and (as it later proved) economically impossible demands for "Reparations" were directly based. He was inconsistent, of course, for he had promised that there should be no punitive "indemnities," and "reparations" were only indemnities under another name, and on an unprecedented scale. But worse yet, he was forced into a kind of Pharisaism of which no Christian should be guilty, when he permitted *sole guilt, exclusive responsibility*, for the First World War to be imputed to the Central Powers.¹ To understand how Wilson and other men of good will found this language acceptable, it should be made clear that the intention of the clause in the first place was simply to establish a legal basis for a fair and moderate bill of damages for destruction caused by the German armies. It was only later that this relatively harmless phraseology was made to bear the burden of a huge indemnity and a false

1. The exact wording of this famous clause deserves to be studied: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." (Part VIII, Reparations, Section I, General Provisions; Article 231.)

imputation of sole guilt. But as early as 1921, when I first visited Germany, I found this imputation already rankling in the German mind as the *worst* provision of the Versailles Treaty—worse than the loss of the colonies, worse than the unpayable debts. Wilson is excusable for not having foreseen this emotional exaggeration of the meaning of this clause—but the consequences were none the less fatal.

The worst injustices of the Versailles Treaty spring logically from this unfair imputation of sole guilt, just as the worst excesses of the Nazi reaction spring psychologically from the bitter resentment it engendered in the German mind. When "Christian" nations accused the Germans of sole guilt for the First World War, the more consistent German thinkers (and the Germans are a dreadfully logical people!) reacted by rejecting Christianity altogether, *more especially the Christian notion of sin and guilt*. In the Nazi religion of blood and soil, the Christian sense of guilt is completely suppressed, and the only emotion a German is allowed to feel toward his country is one of arrogant pride—a perfect if somewhat psychopathic antidote to the humiliation heaped upon Germany in 1918!

If, this time, Christians are to lead the way toward a better peace settlement than that of 1918, they may well begin by reconsidering the problem of war guilt. Because matters of guilt, punishment and forgiveness lie within the explicit province of the Christian faith, it is unlikely that Christians can be helpful in other fields if they cannot be helpful in this. Moreover, a right attitude here is likely to have a constructive effect upon everything else in the coming settlement, as a wrong attitude here had a destructive effect upon the whole Versailles settlement. Let us consider, then, (1) what our general Christian teaching is concerning guilt, punishment and forgiveness; (2) where the responsibility lies for this present war, when viewed from an adequately Christian perspective; and (3) what Christians should urge upon their governments concerning the punishment or forgiveness of their present enemies.

One word of caution before proceeding. Let us not hastily suppose that the best way to correct the admitted mistakes of twenty-five years ago is *to take exactly the opposite tack*. That seems to be the principle governing Washington and London in many of their most important policies. Last time, we appealed to the German people, offering them definite and favorable terms if they would overthrow their military rulers; this time, we make no promises, and demand "unconditional surrender," with terms to be dictated in Berlin to a defeated German army. It is by no means certain whether the exact opposite of a policy that failed is going to prove better than the original policy. Especially must we beware of fallacy if we desire our policies to be truly right according to Christian standards. All great Christian ideals are threatened with danger from opposite angles. Recoiling from unchristian pride, we may fall into unchristian subservience. Recoiling from unchristian injustice toward the enemy, we may fall into unchristian injustice toward our friends, the enemy's victims. The Christian combination of justice and mercy is too high and difficult to be arrived at by simply aiming in the opposite direction every time we fail to hit the elusive target! Let us therefore begin by forgetting the failures of our predecessors, and by looking squarely at the "mark of our high calling" which God has set for us in Christ.

1. *Guilt, Punishment, Forgiveness in Christian Teaching*

All men are guilty in the sight of God. Before the divine holiness, it is impossible to enter a plea of complete innocence without being guilty of sinful pride and self-righteousness. This does not mean that ordinary moral distinctions of guilt and innocence are annulled in Christian thought. Christians would generally agree that he who oppresses his neighbor breaks the law of God as well as the laws of man, and is more guilty than his innocent victim, even though society (including the victim) be partly responsible for the crime. Yet in the light of Christ's Gospel, the worst criminal who repents and asks for forgiveness is closer to the Kingdom of God than the upright

but self-righteous person (or nation) who recognizes no guilt in himself, and no need of forgiveness.

While God's mercy welcomes the worst sinner who repents, His justice is inexorable toward those who do not repent. His forgiveness is not an easy-going complacency. Punishment, being the natural consequence of wrong-doing, does not always cease with forgiveness; and the Christ who mediates God's forgiveness shows God's hatred of wrong-doing by the expiatory sufferings he takes upon himself. God's mercy *overcomes* the law of retribution ("whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap") but does not *annul* it. In all ordinary affairs the law still holds good.

It is an over-simplification of the Christian doctrine of punishment to say that it is solely designed (like parental discipline) to cure the wrong-doer, and is therefore an expression of love toward him. Punishment has other uses: to deter other wrong-doers and thus protect society, or simply to uphold the majesty of law, the sovereignty of right, when faith in the moral order has been shaken.

Men need less urging to serve as ministers of divine retribution than to serve as ministers of divine forgiveness. It is a good rule, then, to be over-severe in judging one's own guilt, and over-lenient in judging that of one's enemies. Nevertheless, an excess of leniency toward one's enemies which would work injustice toward one's friends is conceivable. Such lack of justice would create new problems for future generations. It is easy to confuse lazy indifference with Christian magnanimity.

Two conclusions, at least, stand out clearly: (1) no nation is so good as to be guiltless, (2) no nation is so bad as to be hopeless. It follows that retribution can never be just when visited only on the defeated enemy; and retribution must never exclude the hope of reconciliation. The door of the future must never be slammed shut in a nation's face. When that happens, dark forces are generated behind the slammed door which eventually blow up with a resounding crash that shakes the world.

2. *Responsibility for the Present War*

It was possible for historians to dispute about "who started" the First World War, and to throw a considerable portion of the responsibility for it on Russia, France and other Allied Powers. This time there can be no problem about where primary responsibility lies, in the simple sense. No immediate responsibility lies upon the United Nations for starting the war. Their sins are rather sins of *omission* than of commission; their beligerency was on the whole *too slowly* aroused—"too little and too late"—to prevent the war. The war was started by a series of overt, aggressive acts (beginning with Japan's invasion of Manchuria and Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, ending with Germany's invasion of Poland), which, if they had gone unresisted much longer, would have resulted in the world being dominated by these three powers. Within each of the three aggressor nations, primary responsibility for these overt acts can be still further localized in a small dictatorial clique which has seized control of the nation and maintained itself by force.

While primary responsibility is thus clearly localized, it would be most unrealistic to throw the entire blame for the war upon the Fascist and Nazi parties, and the younger officers' military clique in Japan. Some responsibility rests upon the people of these nations who allowed themselves to be captured and led by organized bands of desperadoes. Greatest responsibility, of course, rests upon those who actively supported their nation's enslavers; next, upon those who passively accepted them; least, upon those who dared to oppose them. But, from the time when Mussolini and Hitler rose to power in Europe, and "government by assassination" began in Japan, the people of these countries have been so unfree to resist their captors that they have no longer been fully responsible for their acts. They are in the position of drug addicts, not fully responsible for what their evil habits make them do, but guilty of having formed the habits while still free to resist. Many Germans now believe that their country had a real opportunity to lead Central Europe into

a new era of peace and prosperity, if she had made a virtue of her disarmament in 1918, instead of resenting it so fiercely and scheming for revenge. That Germany did what she did, in a bitter mood of desperation, she now has good reason to repent.

But this is not the end of the story. As Sir Norman Angell has said,

"We discuss the re-education of Germany and how it should be undertaken. But we hear very little of the problem of alliance or coalition mentality, of the forces which . . . broke up the alliance that won the last war and by so doing broke up the peace. No forums discuss, 'Are the Allies Incurable?' and few psychologists seem interested in the neuroses which made it impossible for the victors to apply a workable policy to the vanquished of the last war.

"The very suggestion that we might usefully devote some attention to this aspect of the problem usually provokes moral indignation. It is taken as implying that the enemy and the Allies are on the same moral plane. Which, of course, is nonsense. Or that the Allies are themselves in some measure to blame for this war. Which of course is true."

(The New York Times Magazine, Sunday, Aug. 8, 1943)

Why were Germany, Italy and Japan led to choose the path of military dictatorship and international banditry, rather than the path of international conciliation and cooperation? Why was the conciliatory diplomacy of Stresemann and Briand so abruptly abandoned in Europe, and that of Shidehara in East Asia? To answer such questions adequately, it is not enough to point to some inherited taint of belligerency running through the history of these three nations. It is necessary, also, to point the finger of accusation at the Allied Powers of 1914-1918, who, after winning the war, failed to organize the peace.

A good objective analysis of the political failure of the Allied Powers will be found in the following passage from *The Church and the New Order*, by William Paton, late secretary of the International Missionary Council and of the World Council of Churches: "The period between the last war and the outbreak of the present one is now seen to have been an uneasy interlude in which nothing was settled ('things are not settled until they are settled right'), and the forces of disorder and destruc-

tion gradually gained the upper hand. . . . There were two possible policies open. One was to assume the permanent and congenital dangerousness of Germany, and to prevent her, both by unilateral disarmament and by the formation of an overwhelming combined armed force against her, from ever again threatening the peace of Europe; the other was to try to win her to cooperation with other nations. Both were tried, neither whole-heartedly. The failure of the United States to enter the League meant that France lost her protection in the Anglo-American guarantee—our own signature to it being conditional upon American acceptance—and France turned to the obvious alternative, which was to use the League as an alliance against Germany. To this policy Britain was opposed, but never opposed in the sense that she would throw herself heartily into any other and better course. . . . The result was that the only possible concentration of power (Britain and France) which might have been strong enough, if it knew its mind, to keep the peace and approach the problems of revision in safety, was not consolidated until it was too late.

"If the League system was to have fulfilled the hopes of its founders, action along three lines was needed, and it is at least doubtful whether, after the U.S.A. had refused to join the League, they were really possible. Provision must be made for revision, or what came to be called 'peaceful change,' so that the settlement might become one which it was the interest of all to preserve. The obligations imposed by the 1919 settlement on certain (vanquished) states should have been extended so as to bear equally upon all members. Means should have been devised to secure the safety of each member of the community of nations by the action of the community as a whole. None of these things was done. . . .

"Once it became clear that there was neither strength to make wise and gradual change nor determination to prevent armed aggression by resolute force, the way was open to the unprincipled tactics of the new type of leadership thrown up by the new social conditions of these years" (*op. cit.*, pp. 35-40).

In addition to these political causes, stress must be laid upon certain economic causes, centering above all in the U.S.A. When the United States (a) maintained an untenable high tariff policy combined paradoxically with an insistence upon the collection of war debts, and (b) elected at the time of the London Economic Conference to tackle the world-wide problem of depression and unemployment by herself instead of by international action, she threw the rest of the world into confusion and despair. Economic autarchy and militarism were the inevitable consequences. Hitler's vote mounted as unemployment grew in Germany, and rearmament seemed to be the one sure cure for this grave economic disease.

If it is indeed true that the Allies share the guilt of this war in a real though secondary sense, why not confess it openly? Having seen that a peace settlement based upon a lie soon went to the devil (the Father of Lies) why should we not try the experiment of basing the next settlement, as far as we may, upon the truth, the whole truth, the healing and uniting truth that "sets us free?" The truth is, that we all share some degree of responsibility for this catastrophe. The human race has faced a great opportunity—the first opportunity to organize mankind for justice and peace on a planetary scale—and has been so generally blinded by national egotism that world opportunity has been turned into world tragedy. It is not important to decide just how the blame should be apportioned. Let each nation, if it will, make its own humble confession. (With the possible exception of China, the first to be attacked, we have all tried to save our own skins at the expense of our neighbors, and failed to concern ourselves with the common good until our own immediate interests were at stake. Even little Poland has to confess that, shortly before she was herself attacked, she joined in the attack upon her neighbor, Czecho-Slovakia). *The important thing is, to base the new peace settlement upon the clear understanding that we all share to some extent in the guilt of this war, and must all therefore share in the toil and expense of reconstruction. If this truth can be candidly recog-*

nized by the makers of the peace, if not in words at least in deeds and tacit attitudes, then the corner-stone of the new world order will be securely laid, and the superstructure will not be so likely to topple over in the first storm. The actual bill for post-war relief and reconstruction is going to be too colossal for any one nation or group of nations to pay. It must in fact be paid by all, and it will be paid the more cheerfully and expeditiously if it comes to be recognized that it *ought* to be paid by all. While limited portions of the bill ought to be paid by those nations which immediately caused the damage—such portions as would be recognized as legitimate claims for damages in any law court—the general principle must be and should be that nations contribute to world relief and world reconstruction *according to their ability to help rather than according to the degree of guilt.*

If it be asked how we can have the heart to prosecute war against our enemies while recognizing that there is some wrong on our side as well as on theirs, an analogy may perhaps help to make the answer clear. It is based on an episode from an Australian novel, *For the Term of His Natural Life*, by Marcus Clarke—a novel which did as much to reform the Australian prison colonies as the novels of Dickens did to reform the debtors' prisons in England. The scene of this episode is aboard a crowded, filthy prison-ship, on which prisoners are being transported "for the term of their natural life" to the dreadful barracks of Tasmania and Norfolk Island. Pine, the ship's doctor, has been laboring in vain to get Captain Vickers to treat the convicts in the pestilence-ridden hold more humanely; but now he has discovered that the prisoners are about to mutiny, and he is urging the Captain to take stern measures to put down the insurrection. Vickers feels a belated twinge of guilt, and urges appeasement.

"But surely, Mr. Pine, have you considered the probable loss of life? I—really—some more humane course. Prevention, you know—

"Have *you* considered the safety of the ship, Captain Vickers. . . .

You don't know what convicts are, or rather what the law has made 'em—yet—"

"Poor wretches!" says Vickers, who, like many martinets, was in reality tender-hearted, "Kindness might do much for them. After all, they are our fellow-creatures."

"Yes," returned the other, "they are. But if you use that argument when they have taken the vessel, it won't avail you much." (*Op. cit.*, p. 65. Macmillan edition, London, 1935.)

The parable ought not to be hard to interpret. We of the Allied Powers are guilty of having allowed the world to drift into a miserable state after 1918, when it was within our power to control the situation. We have made mistakes in dealing with our former enemies which have driven them to desperation, and caused them to put their trust in a gang of brigands, who have started a mutiny against civilization. Some of us, perceiving our guilt when we saw its awful consequences, and shrinking from the necessity of violence, have proposed to make atonement for our sins by trying to appease the desperadoes on the eve of the insurrection—like Captain Vickers. No self-respecting Christian pacifist would ever wish his position to be confused with an attitude so unrealistic, so cowardly and so futile. Doctor Pine surely is closer to the attitude which most Christians would take under the circumstances: namely, that the mutiny must be put down and then mercy as well as justice should be shown to the mutineers, in all future dealings with them. Recognize while you fight them that they are your fellow-creatures, and that you are partly guilty of driving them to mutiny; but *don't expect any mercy from them, or any justice, if they once get command of the ship*—which in our case means the world. Under such circumstances, compassionate men like Pine can and will fight firmly; and so must we, till this world mutiny is quelled, and order reestablished. (I make no attempt here to interpret the Christian pacifist position; but rather to make clear the position of the Christian who fights his enemy with a knowledge of his own complicity in the enemy's guilt,

and a determination to befriend his enemy as soon as circumstances make it possible.)

3. *Punishment and Forgiveness in the Peace Settlement*

(1) *There must be some punishment in the settlement, to re-establish respect for moral law in our badly demoralized world.* Especially is this necessary for the sake of the people of the conquered countries, many of whom have not only lost faith in the existence of a just God, but also in common human decency. If there is no attempt made at legal punishment of their oppressors, these peoples will take the law into their own hands, and wreak their vengeance indiscriminately. They are full of bitter fear, and their fears will make them merciless unless their fears are allayed by the firm administration of justice, and through the reestablishment of moral order.

(2) *The clearest case for drastic punishment can be made out against individuals immediately responsible for proved atrocities, especially for clear infractions of the Geneva Convention and other written, recognized provisions of international law.* Every effort should be made to bring such persons to trial before international courts whose sound, non-partisan character should be placed beyond dispute by including eminent jurists from enemy and, above all, from neutral countries. Complaints against representatives of the United Nations for alleged military atrocities or infractions of international law may be heard by these same courts. *Sure and speedy justice* is the main desideratum. Every attempt should be made to keep these trials from dragging on wearily and petering out ingloriously, as happened after the First World War. (See Sheldon Glueck's article in *Free World* for November, 1942).

(3) *It is unwise and impracticable to treat the military and political leaders of enemy countries as criminals.*² The tradi-

2. This does not mean that an individual unmistakably guilty of crime shall be allowed to go scot free just because he happens to hold high office. It means

tional punishment of leaders who betray their country into disaster is *deposition and exile*. If they are thoroughly discredited—as is already the case with Mussolini, and will probably be the case with his colleagues in the Axis—their late opponents will be well advised to let them end their days, like the Kaiser, in exile in some neutral country, rather than to make heroes of them by arresting and trying them. There is every likelihood that such trials, if staged by the Allies, would backfire almost as badly as the notorious Riom trials by the Nazis—above all if the death penalty were to be invoked. No one has ever more deserved severe retribution than Napoleon, for the woes he visited upon all Europe for twenty years; but the British were wise in sending him to St. Helena instead of executing him. Even so, his imprisonment helped to make him a hero, and so helped perpetuate the imperialist dream which plagued Europe again under Napoleon III.

(4) *The people of Germany, Italy and Japan will be sufficiently punished by the humiliations and disasters that are surely ahead of them: devastation of their homelands, military occupation, and international supervision of their affairs as a precaution against similar outbreaks in the future.* The punishment involved in these impending events is so heavy that it is already evoking our pity, in the case of Italy and even of Germany. (Every Christian in the United States would avoid, if possible, the destruction of German and Italian cities.) Nations, like individuals, may react penitently to humiliations, if these are seen to be the direct consequence of their misdeeds, and are

that leaders are not to be made scapegoats just because they are prominent and powerful, and the hatred felt for their nation tends to center upon them personally. It is probable that more men of definitely criminal mentality and record hold high office in the three Axis governments, secret police, and armed forces than in any other group of allied nations in modern history; but such men should be tried and sentenced—if they escape assassination and do not commit suicide—as individuals, not as leaders. And as this distinction is hard to make, exemplary punishment for a few must probably suffice. Of course any leader who retains enough prestige to make a "return from Elba" possible should be kept under close surveillance.

not too prolonged nor too cruel. But when humiliation is heaped upon humiliation, the result is quite the reverse. Humiliation too great to be borne leads to a violent reassertion of one's own virtue, without reservations, and a new cycle of vengeance and counter-vengeance is thus set up.

The Archbishop of Canterbury has wisely remarked that "so far as any settlement is penal, it loses its quality of justice as the years pass." (Sermon in London, October 18, 1942). What must above all be avoided, in dealing with our defeated enemies, is any form of mass punishment which has the effect of penalizing future generations, and cutting off the hope of national revival, or of equal fellowship with other nations. "We must look forward to renewed fellowship," says the Archbishop, "and consequently, while the settlement is bound to be such as will appear severe to the German state, it must also be such as to secure to the ordinary German citizen of future generations an even chance in sharing the benefits of civilization with his neighbors, provided his state itself is behaving as a good neighbor among them" (Ibid)³.

A clear example of the infraction of these principles, especially (3) and (4), is to be found in the proposals for the punishment of Japan offered by Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan of the Chinese Government:

3. Cf. the following pronouncement of the Round-Table of Christian Leaders at Princeton, N. J., July 23, 1943. (1 In regard to Germany: "Christianity involves reconciliation on the basis of justice, and the meeting of a spirit of repentance with a spirit of forgiveness." (2 Regarding Japan: "Although the terms exacted from Japan will be severe, as Christians, we urge that they be just, constructive and not retributive. They must not be carried to the point where Japan would be deprived of hope or prospect of economic revival and of readmission into international society with its consequent rights and duties." Dwight Bradley comments on this pronouncement that it is "very abstract"—as abstract on the Christian side as is the following pronouncement of Sun Fo on the side of a non-Christian "idealized retribution." I agree with him that what is needed is a statement based on "historical realism under a Christian compulsion." It is for that reason that I especially welcome the attached statements by two fellow-Christians, one German and one Chinese, whose knowledge of the "historical realities" in Germany and the Far East is superior to mine.

The officers of the Japanese Army have shown themselves brutal and cruel arch-criminals, and as a body they should be tried and dealt with. Above the rank of major generals they should be shot. Above the rank of lieutenants they should be interned or imprisoned for life. The non-commissioned officers should be dispersed to other lands and given hard labor. In this way the military caste and cadre will be separated from the people at home.⁴ To carry out the industrial disarmament of Japan it is necessary to demolish whatever is left of the Japanese war industries, heavy industries and machine-building industry. . . . There should also be a limitation of Japanese light industries. . . .

Some of our friends think that we should not impose poverty upon Japan. Such friends generously propose that the greater part of the China market shall be reserved for Japan.⁵ Such ideas are dangerous for peace. We must make Japan taste the bitter fruit of defeat and poverty. (*New York Times Magazine*, July 11, 1943.)

Dr. Sun Fo is evidently so much afraid of the resurgence of the Japanese military-industrial machine that he is ready to treat his enemies as savages treat their fallen foes, without mercy. "Magnanimity to the enemy is cruelty to your friend"—this Chinese proverb which he quotes in extenuation of his harsh proposal appears to be as devoid of Confucian moderation as it is of Christian charity. One wonders whether Mme. Chiang Kai Shek would not counter it with another and a better saying.

If magnanimity is to prevail toward our foes in the peace settlement, that does not mean, of course, that they should be treated better than their victims, nor that any precautionary measures should be omitted which might give real security to their neighbors against further assaults. Security and magnanimity are not opposites, but correlates. Christians should beware of the kind of amnesty which is merely another name for careless indifference toward the real danger of a recurrence of the twice-repeated tragedy of World War. It is probable that,

4. On the contrary, nothing would be more likely than this to *attach* the Japanese people to their military caste!

5. This of course is a palpable hit. Japan's economic needs must not be met solely at the expense of her chief victim, but by international action involving common sacrifice if necessary, mutual benefits if possible.

in proportion to the completeness of the Axis defeat and the completeness of precautions against another Axis outbreak, the disposition to magnanimity will grow on the Allied side. Somervell, the Everest climber—afterward a medical missionary in India—tells in his autobiography of his reaction to the news of the first Armistice Day. "Damn!" he exclaimed. "Just when we'd got Jerry on the run! Now it'll be a stalemate sort of peace, and we'll have to make harsh terms to show them we've won, as most of them won't know whether we have or not. But if we'd had a few weeks more . . . we could afford to show great clemency in the peace terms and everyone would be happy."⁶ Subsequent events justified his anxiety. Woodrow Wilson tried hard for a magnanimous peace, but French fears of the future—only too well grounded—counteracted his efforts. The result was a peace *neither severe enough to be crushing* (which is what Clemenceau wanted) *nor magnanimous enough to be reconciling* (which is what Wilson wanted). It is to be hoped that the coming peace will be *both more decisive* against Axis pretensions *and more generous* toward the peoples now our enemies, provided that they begin and continue to act as good neighbors. The details of such a just and durable settlement are beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that the settlement should be based upon a decisive victory, followed by a period of strict surveillance, leading to responsible self-government and readmission to the community of nations, with rewards in case of cooperative behavior and strong sanctions against further military adventures. Such a policy would be analogous to the probation system in the treatment of criminals, and in conformity with the general theory of guilt, punishment and forgiveness which has been stated in the first section of this article.

Whatever governments may be led to do through the influence of Christian public opinion, there will remain many things for Christians to do which governments cannot be expected to

6. Somervell, T. H., *After Everest*, p. 42 (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 2nd edition 1938).

initiate. Especially must Christians take the initiative in the expression of mercy and forgiveness. Governments can at best be just; when they profess to be merciful, the profession probably masks some unworthy motive. It is important, therefore, that Christians be early on the spot in enemy countries, with their ministry of reconciliation. There is no reason to wait until enemy countries have "brought forth fruits meet for repentance." True Christian forgiveness does not wait for repentance, but hastens to the aid of those who are fallen, just because they are fallen. This is what the Quaker relief workers did to the Germans at the close of the last war; and it has never been forgotten. Such work must not be left to the Quakers this time; it must have the support of the whole Christian church. Collaboration between Christians in Allied and Axis countries may perhaps prove to be one of the most hopeful approaches to world reconstruction. Such collaboration rests finally upon a sense of shared guilt and common contrition, freely confessed to one another. "Yes, the Versailles treaty was unjust," said a German pastor's wife to me soon after the last war, "but I ask myself, would we have been as just if we had won?" Such candid confessions are rare, except among Christians; but whenever they are made, the ice is broken, and mutual contrition takes the place of mutual recrimination. Then and there, in the secret place where two Christians of two recently warring nations humble their hearts together before the judgment seat of God, peace begins to be made; and the foundations of this peace are as unshakable as the Holy Will of God on which they rest.



WAR GUILT

BY CH'EN SHOU-YI

Professor Horton's article on war guilt has not only raised the basic issues with which the victorious United Nations will be confronted upon the future cessation of hostilities, but also has urged upon us the adoption of a fundamentally Christian attitude in meting out punishment for the defeated enemies. All readers will doubtless agree with him that, in the sight of God, no nations, as no individuals, are so good as to be guiltless, or yet so bad as to be hopeless. Furthermore, all readers will doubtless also agree with him that though primary responsibility for "starting" this Second World War can be unquestionably localized in the aggressor nations, most other nations have directly or by indirection contributed to the general deterioration of the international order; and that consequently, all men stand in need of a reeducation, a new faith, and above all a rebirth, victors and vanquished alike.

While admitting the soundness of his general principles, some readers will probably question the practicability of one or two of Professor Horton's more concrete suggestions.

Such a question may be raised as to the practical wisdom of a public confession by the victorious nations for the sharing of guilt, or a peace treaty imbued with the spirit of forgiveness and imposing only token punishments on the aggressors. Would not such a move give millions of Japanese imperialist die-hards the impression that, after all, the United Nations are "soft," the feeling of unearned relaxation that their loss is slight; and the revived hope that in due course the "hallowed spirit" of their "imperial ancestors . . . of a line unbroken for ages eternal" would bless them more bountifully in their second venture? A careful reading of Professor Horton's article

as a whole reveals, of course, that the dreadful crimes of the international gangsters should not be lightly glossed over. Nor is Christian magnanimity to be interpreted as short-sighted and excessive mildness. What he tries to avoid is to repeat the error of imputation of sole guilt, which has so demonstrably failed to serve the cause of conciliation and peace. We must remember that the attitude with which punishments are imposed is oftentimes more significant than the volume and severity of the punishments themselves. Thus a long preamble of a conciliatory nature to the peace treaty will make the assignment of war guilt and the division of responsibility much more just and acceptable. Tseng Tzu, one of the disciples of Confucius, once advised a criminal judge: "When you have found out the truth of any accusation, be grieved for and pity them, and do not feel joy at your own ability."

Some other readers may also wonder whether (2) and (3) in Section III can be carried out simultaneously in such a way as to achieve justice. It would be extremely unwise to put a halo around the heads of the political and military leaders of the Axis countries by arresting, trying, and sentencing them. And yet if sure and speedy justice and drastic punishment are to be meted out against individual perpetrators of atrocities in violation of the Geneva Convention and other provisions of international law, shall we punish only the men and lower officers who participated in the Rape of Nanking whose identity we can establish, and leave the generals in peace to go into exile in some neutral country? Wouldn't it give the badly demoralized world the impression of a distorted justice whereby "one who has stolen a hook faces decapitation while another who has stolen a marquise becomes a marquis"? Can there not be any more edifying way of dealing with these real arch-criminals, which will not make heroes out of them?

In this connection it is well to point out that Professor Horton has probably been a little too severe as a critic of Dr. Sun Fo. What the latter has in mind, it seems to me, is the prevention of the resurgence of Japanese militarism, and not

the permanent crippling of the common people of Japan, especially after they have clearly shown a change of heart and attitude. Dr. Sun's terms look positively harsh, though decidedly milder in comparison with retaliative measures being formulated by many people against the Germans. He doubtless realizes the necessity of reeducating and reaccommodating the Japanese with the coming of peace for he has made the statement recently that "We will be ready and willing to establish normal relations with a new Japan." (*Time*, Oct. 18, 1943, p. 35) China will have to learn to live in peace and share her resources with Japan, as well as other nations. As the Chinese nation comes to feel more secure between now and the peace, she will, in proportion, learn to be more magnanimous. She will benefit from the example of Christian nations.

Readers should note with great satisfaction that Professor Horton has dealt with the Japanese and the Germans in exactly the same terms. There is considerable danger, on our part, of condemning one group excessively. Despite the racial affinity between China and Japan, I, speaking as a Chinese, wish to make clear that historical realism in this particular is of no great significance, and that the Japanese, as our common enemies, are probably no better than the Germans, and certainly no worse. Both groups deserve a "spanking" peace and not a "killing" peace. But even the spanking must be done in a good spirit though with a firm hand.



WAR GUILT

BY FRANZ SCHOENBERNER

The problem of war guilt as well as that of the future peace settlement can not be discussed from the moral or religious angle alone. The moral aspect can not be separated from the political and economic aspects of the problem.

It is the mistake of most peace plans to approach the problem only from one angle, attributing the guilt for wars in general and for our present predicament in particular *exclusively* to the lack of religious and moral insights or *exclusively* to political or *exclusively* to economic and social factors. Actually, all these three factors share in the guilt, interdependent as they are and interrelated in a sort of continuous reciprocal action. In trying to lay the foundations for an ordered world we have to proceed on all three lines,—we have to create *general* world order. It is not sufficient to preach a religious awakening without thinking of the necessity of making religion “practical” in the political and economic sense. It is not sufficient to invent a purely political system, a sort of global “balance of power” as Ely Culbertson did, without taking into account the moral and economic side of the peace problem. And, finally, it is not sufficient to emphasize the economic factor as the only real force determining the political as well as the ideological sphere and to believe, like Marx and many sociologists, in a solution based *exclusively* upon a better economic system.

Proceeding from this general insight we have to state that, as Professor Horton points out, the basic mistake of the Versailles Treaty was the moral mistake of imputing sole guilt and exclusive responsibility for the First World War to Germany and her Allies. It is true that the political and economic injustices of the Treaty “spring logically” from this moral injustice. But perhaps Professor Horton overrates the moral and psychological reper-

cussions of the war guilt clause upon the German people and underrates the political and economic developments leading to the rise of Hitler and so finally to the war.

The "worst excesses of the Nazi reaction" sprang not alone from "the bitter resentment engendered in the German mind" by the fact that "Christian nations," under the pressure of a prolonged hunger blockade, extorted the acceptance of the war guilt clause. And, certainly, it is too much said that "the more consistent thinkers" among the Germans "reacted by rejecting Christianity altogether, more especially the Christian notions of sin and guilt."

In fact this sort of Nazi religion is not the religion of the German people. And among the Nazis themselves there never have been nor are there individuals who deserve the name of "thinkers" or even "more consistent thinkers." The pseudo-scientific rubbish of an illiterate faker like the Nazi-Philosopher Alfred Rosenberg is not more representative of German thought than Father Divine is of American thought. Except for the small minority of fanatical Nazis, no better educated German takes Rosenberg's "Myth of the 20th Century" as seriously as it is unfortunately taken by many serious non-German people all over the world (including even a scholar like Adolf Keller).

I must warn here against the basic mistake of falling for the Nazi propaganda which claims again and again that Nazism is the legitimate expression of German mentality, that Hitler and the German people are one, that the Nazis are "Germany." We must never forget that the German people for more than ten years has been gagged and silenced by the bloody terror of a total dictatorship; that a vocal and violent minority, in fact a gang of criminals, came to power and is held in power by ruse and force; that it was and is supported not by the German people, but by very specific political and economic powers in Germany—and in the whole world.

I shall return to this point later in another context. Here it is sufficient to say that the so-called "war-guilt lie" was only one of the many different propaganda devices of the Nazis, perhaps

even less efficient than, for example, their vulgar anti-semitism, their pseudo-socialism and so on. This slogan has been exploited before by every sort of "national" movement in Germany. What really made nationalistic and Nazi propaganda so successful, was not so much the moral mistake of the war guilt clause itself, as its political and economic consequences, the political and economic isolation and strangulation of the new-born republican and democratic Germany.

It is significant that, soon after the war and especially in the time of apparent political and economic stabilization between 1924 and 1929, the moral invalidity of the war guilt clause was generally recognized not only by many scholars but by large sections of public opinion in the Allied Nations. And, on the other hand, it is significant that nationalistic and Nazi propaganda during this time lost more and more the influence which it gained in the political and economic turmoil of counterrevolution and inflation between 1919 and 1923.

We must emphasize the fact that, besides the moral factor of a wrongly attributed guilt, political and economic factors were even more responsible for Hitler's coming to power and so for the war. And we should keep it in mind that these factors or forces are not abstractions but are represented and personified by individuals or groups of individuals, by clans or classes.

We should beware of abstractions especially in the discussion of war guilt. It is typical that the phrasing of the war guilt clause used the word "Germany." Without being a student of semantics, every clear thinking man should ask the question "What Germany?" "What is Germany?" There were and are as many different Germanys as there are many different Americas, Frances, Englands, Italys, Spains and even Japans.

The Germany with which the victors in 1919 had to deal was certainly *not* the Germany of the Kaiser nor of the militaristic, imperialistic and reactionary ruling class, composed of Generals, Junkers and certain financial and industrial tycoons, all of whom had at least a large, though not exclusive, responsibility for the outbreak of World War I. The Germany of the Weimar Repub-

lic was certainly a weak and imperfect, but nevertheless sincere, attempt by the German people to translate into the political and economic realm of reality those same great liberal ideas and ideals which, until then, had found their full expression almost exclusively in German literature, art and philosophy.

The real German people, the Germany of the common man and the spiritual Germany, had been defeated in every revolution from the Peasant War in the time of the Reformation to the revolution in 1848. In 1918 it tried again—and tragically failed—to get rid of the established powers of political and economic reaction. The hysterical Kaiser and all the little kings or princes were removed, but not the unholy alliance of militaristic Generals, of feudalistic East Prussian Junkers and economic marplots, all of them fiercely opposed to political and even more to economic and social reforms, all of them hiding their personal or their class interest behind a rabid nationalism. This unholy alliance became invincible because it was supported, both indirectly and directly, by the much larger corresponding international alliance.

The international policy toward Germany after 1919 was determined by two different and partly contradictory fears: The fear of German revenge and the fear of Russian bolshevism. The first tendency resulted in a policy of political humiliation and economic strangulation, which necessarily discredited the Republican government before its own followers and provided the best ammunition for the frantic attacks of the united German reaction against the Republic and against the idea of democratic world cooperation. Professor Horton states that "Wilson tried hard for a magnanimous peace, but French fears of the future—only too well grounded—counteracted this effort." It seems to me that these "French fears for the future," expressed in a policy of distrust, suspicion and coercion, to a large extent *created* a situation in which, finally, these fears *became* indeed "too well grounded."

In addition to this indirect support from a policy of exasperated and exasperating nationalism (the mutual collaboration of

different nationalisms), the forces of German reaction received the *direct* support of an international policy determined by the fear of Russian bolshevism. The highly exaggerated danger of Communism in Germany seemed greater than the danger of German Nationalism. Sincere German democrats and liberals were considered as "reds" and treated with more suspicion than even German generals or German industrialists and bankers.

Clinging desperately to an outmoded and faulty economic system, these international forces not only prepared—by creating economic and social world chaos—the way for every sort of dictatorial charlatan, but even more, they consciously and directly—by money, propaganda and political influence—supported these adventurers in every part of the world. We know that Fiat and other great Italian industrialists financed Mussolini exactly as Thyssen, I. G. Farben and other German Big Business financed Hitler. We know who financed Franco's crusade. We know that Hitler's inexhaustible party funds were collected in every currency of the world, not only in marks, but in French francs, in English pounds, in Italian lire—yes, and in American dollars. Ironically enough, he even found Jewish supporters. With the simple propaganda trick of recommending himself as a "bulwark against Communism" every dictator, particularly Hitler, could establish his career, in his own country and in the world.

The whole suicidal appeasement policy, going hand in hand with the international effort to rearm a more and more aggressive Nazi Germany, was based upon the clever idea that Nazi-Germany had to be rearmed against Russia. Ironically enough, this sort of appeasement was for a long time eagerly supported by a sincere but shortsighted pacifism, often connected with a not less shortsighted isolationism. Thus, in certain circles, the frank recognition of the injustices of the Versailles Treaty prompted the belief in the policy of concessions and favors heaped upon Hitler. Such a policy inaugurated fifteen years earlier would have saved the Weimar Republic and probably saved the world from the war, but in 1933 it made the catastrophe inevitable. The possible remedy had turned to poison.

Remembering this general trend of international policy determined by reactionary elements in all countries, we can agree with Professor Horton's statement, "It would be most unrealistic to throw the entire blame for the war upon the Fascist and Nazi parties and the younger officers' military clique in Japan."

To a certain extent we may even agree that "some responsibility rests upon the people of those nations who allowed themselves to be captured and led by organized bands of desperados." But they share this responsibility with the peoples of all democratic nations who allowed their policy towards Fascism and Nazism to be influenced, if not directed, by "organized bands" of political and economic die-hards, by a powerful press which for years, under the signatures of parliamentarians, university presidents and other authorities, never tired of praising Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, etc. and all their works.

The peoples of Italy, Germany and Japan were never—at least not in their majority—"drug addicts not fully responsible for what their evil habits make them do, but guilty of having formed the habits while still free to resist." They never "*chose* the path of military dictatorship and international banditry rather than the path of international conciliation and cooperation." But in all three cases they were fooled and forced into slavery by their own big business and by international big business which at this price paid its hired men, Nazis, fascists and Japanese officers, in order to fight the bugbear of "Communism" even in the form of simple reforms long since overdue. The well known slogan "Rather Hitler than the Popular Front" was not only the slogan of French Reaction which long before the war prepared the defeat of the Republic, the dictatorship of Petain and the policy of "collaboration." It was for 25 years the watchword of international collaborationism not only with Hitler, but with Mussolini and every sort of dictatorship. It was the war cry against any sort of liberal and democratic policy, against any sort of "Popular Front" which, by the way, neither in France nor in Spain included the Communists. It is indeed, as Professor Horton says, "not enough to point to some in-

herited taint of belligerency running through the history of these three nations," a taint, by the way, to be found in the history of almost every European nation. The trouble with the German people is not their belligerency. There was no enthusiasm for war in Germany. Mr. Chamberlain received the most spirited ovations in Munich, because he seemed to assure "peace for our time." The indifference and apathy of the German people, even after Hitler's first most spectacular victories, has been unanimously confirmed by all the neutral observers.

The trouble especially with the German and the Japanese people is not their belligerency, but their long training in military obedience, their blind belief in and respect for authority, their law-obedience, their orderliness and thoroughness. But the Italian example shows that even a people without such traditions can be rendered helpless by a dictatorship for 20 years and can be forced to commit atrocities like those in Ethiopia—which, at the time, were unable to arouse the conscience of the world.

The question of the collective responsibility of a whole people for the acts or misdeeds of its leaders—even though these leaders are not terroristic dictators—is in itself very controversial. The great English historian Burke has said: "You can not indict a whole people," and probably he was right. Lincoln, the incarnation of and the most sincere believer in democracy, has said "you may fool all the people some of the time; you can even fool some of the people all the time." If this is true—even in a democracy—then the question of collective responsibility is clearly answered in the negative. It is small comfort that "you can not fool all the people all the time." Because, until the people finally realize they are being fooled, they may be fooled into helplessness. They may be held down by the well-armed terror exercised by the relatively small minority of those who, misled by a ruthless master cheat, can be "fooled all the time." It has happened time and again, not in Germany only, but in Italy and in France, even 80 years before Petain. It can happen everywhere—even in Louisiana.

Strange as it is, the simple commonplace that a dictatorship means necessarily the terroristic rule of a minority over an opposed but helplessly silenced majority seems thoroughly confused by the busy advertising men of dictatorship—inside as well as outside dictatorial countries. It comes as a shock even to Americans trying to see the truth, if you ask such simple questions: "Why if Hitler and the German people are really one, as claimed by his propaganda (and by the parallel propaganda of irresponsible anti-Germanists even in this country), why then does this regime need hundreds of concentration camps provided with special crematories, camps through which, according to a very conservative estimate, at least a million Germans have passed—or not passed? Why were and are thousands and thousands of "enemies of the state," that is of Hitler, massacred, sentenced or tortured to death? Why a secret police system more total and better organized than any other in the world? Why a Gestapo army of at first 500,000, and now augmented by 750,000 more men, fully equipped with bombers and tanks, a real army of occupation *in* Germany? If indeed, according to fake plebiscites, 99 per cent or at any rate a great majority of the German people were behind Hitler, then, of course, his regime would cease to be a dictatorship. It would be a democracy and could rule with democratic procedures. But the public opinion of the world, accustomed to ignoring the atrocities of this regime as long as they did not spread over the German borders, is even now inclined to become confused by a sort of vulgar Anti-Germanism which in fact is not more moral and not more rational than vulgar anti-semitism.

These facts have to be remembered when we are trying to establish the guilt of "Germany," "Italy," or "Japan." But, on the other hand, the very personal responsibility, the unpardonable guilt of the real war criminals—individuals and groups of individuals—has to be stipulated without any ambiguity, according to President Roosevelt's official pronouncement that, without resorting to mass reprisals, "just and sure punishment shall be meted out to the ringleaders responsible for the organized

murder of thousands of innocent persons and the commission of atrocities which have violated every tenet of the Christian faith."

Here I cannot entirely agree with Professor Horton. Lloyd George's "Hang the Kaiser" was indeed nothing more than an election slogan. But the crimes committed for 10 years, inside and outside of Germany, by mass murderers like Hitler, Goering, Himmler and all his hangmen have to be punished as every crime is punished (or at least should be punished) in orderly society. It would be revolting if these war criminals, many of whom were previously common peace criminals, were indeed allowed to pass the rest of their lives unmolested in the magnificent South American estates which, as it seems, they are already buying now with their stolen millions. Just in order to avoid mass reprisals, and in justice to the German people itself, a redressing of the moral balance, the trial and punishment of the guilty, seems to me imperative. Professor Horton's very justified claim "for drastic punishment" of individuals "immediately responsible for proved atrocities" seems to me hardly reconcilable with his statement that "it is unwise and impractical to treat the military and political leaders of enemy countries as criminals." There can be no doubt, as Professor Horton states, "that more men of definitely criminal mentality and record hold high office in the three Axis governments, secret police, and armed forces than in any other group of allied nations in modern history." In this case it becomes more or less irrelevant whether they are tried "as individuals" or "as leaders," because these individuals have committed their crimes and could commit their crimes only in their position as leaders.

Perhaps the German people of all the oppressed millions, waiting for the day of liberation from an abject terroristic regime, will judge and punish their oppressors themselves as the Italian people tried to do in the two days between the breakdown of Mussolini's dictatorship and the establishment of a new dictatorship without Mussolini, but with Bagdolio and the Italian King—a regime favored by "expediency."

However that may be, one judicial difficulty remains: that many of these criminals, men like Goering, Rust, Streicher, etc. were, prior to becoming dignitaries of the Third Reich, already judged by legal courts and officially declared irresponsible on the ground of insanity. Every psychiatrist recognizes that Hitler is a well known type of mental case. Other publicly dangerous insane individuals prevail in the highest as well as the lower ranks of Nazi hierarchy. If, for this reason, the death penalty could not be pronounced, the criminally insane belong (and have always belonged) in a well-guarded asylum.

Here the purely moral or religious approach to the problem of war-guilt and war itself becomes, as in the conceptions of religious conscientious objectors, inadequate, because, based on the idea of guilt, punishment and forgiveness, it overlooks the simple and terrible fact of mental derangement. A man running amuck with his dagger or his gun can be rendered innocuous by force only, not by moral appeal. He has to be killed, if he cannot be disarmed otherwise. Insanity is not a moral problem. The real moral problem is: who was criminal enough to give deadly weapons to a maniac? The responsibility for this crime certainly is an international responsibility. But we have to accuse not "France," "England," "America," and so on for the political and economic support given to criminals and madmen, who could have been stopped easily in the beginning by a simple refusal of international cooperation, without the mobilization of a single soldier. We have to localize this responsibility on very distinctive political and economic groups, represented by very distinctive individuals who indeed share in the war guilt.

The basic task of human justice is not to revenge but to prevent crime by removing its causes—and to prevent the guilty from perpetrating further crimes. Proceeding from this principle we must come to the conclusion that we have to remove, not only in Germany, Italy, and Japan, but in the whole world, those political and economic forces and their personal representatives co-responsible for the criminal phenomenon of totalitarian dictatorship, necessarily culminating in the crime of total war.

It is not enough to remove the fascist or Nazi dictatorship or the Japanese "government by assassination," and to leave untouched the international alliance of economic and political reaction which created and used these dictatorships for its own purposes and is now prepared, in order to save itself, to throw away an instrument which has become useless and dangerous.

The problem of war guilt is a problem to be settled not only *between* nations but *within* each nation. It can not be otherwise since this war is not a war between nations but a war between opposite mentalities, opposite political and economic conceptions. It is really, as is so often said, an "international civil war" in the most literal sense. Exactly as in the prelude to this war, the Spanish Civil War, all the different nationalities were represented on *both* sides, now again Germans in every army of the United Nations are fighting against Nazi-Germany, Free French against Vichy French and finally Italians (I dare not yet say Free Italians) against Fascist Italians, and free American Japanese against the slaves of the Mikado. The battle lines cross all geographical, national and racial borders. We have allies even within Germany and Japan as we discovered inside Italy. And, on the other hand, Nazism has its allies even in this country. The hysterical mob lynching Negroes in Detroit certainly gave "aid and comfort to the enemy," at least to the enemy's propaganda. And so does anti-Semitism or any other violation of our democratic ideals.

The victory and the peace have to be won everywhere on two fronts, on the home front as well as on the military front. If this is indeed a "peoples' war," the peace has to be a "peoples' peace,"—not a peace between international bankers meeting in Basle, Switzerland, in the Bank for International Settlements, or between international industrial cartels like I. G. Farben and Standard Oil, dividing the world between themselves—war or no war. It has to be world peace, secured by an economic as well as political world organization and based upon the age-old ethical wisdom of Judeo-Christianity, that we are members of one body and that, if one member suffers, the whole body suf-

fers. The moral and practical insight that the world is one—not only spiritually but politically and economically—makes it self-evident that a so-called punitive peace, directed against the so-called aggressor nations as the only guilty ones, would be, in fact, directed against the whole world. It would defeat its own purpose. It would not be peace, but the first step towards the next war. It would mean—even for the victors—self-destruction. The insight that we cannot have both revenge and peace has been formulated by many responsible statesmen, but perhaps with the greatest force by the leaders of those two peoples that have suffered most and have been the most innocent victims of aggression. The Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang-Kai-Shek as well as the Ethiopian King, the much ridiculed Haile Selassie—none of them belonging to the white race, but to the Christian Community—have raised their voices many times against the spirit of hate which still haunts the white man's world. But fortunately the worst outbursts of hate—humanly understandable as they are—come rather from writing desks than from the foxholes and shell craters. This sort of hate propaganda carried on by irresponsible writers is an offense not only against the moral law but against the law of simple political common sense. It is not only a sort of Nazi-propaganda in reverse, it is factually used by Mr. Goebbels, as proof for his new propaganda line: that even Germans hating Nazism, as most of them do, have no other choice than to fight on to the last, in order to prevent Germany's "total obliteration," as Mr. Westbrook Pegler, for example, puts it. The only truly realistic policy towards Germany would be an idealistic policy: a peace offer not to the Nazis and to their accomplices—generals and irresponsible big businessmen—but a peace offer to the real German people. Such a peace would guarantee more effectively even than Wilson's 14 Points, a world peace, a political and economic organization of the whole world, including Germany as well as every other nation of this planet.

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